Why is praktische Vernunft not (wholly) a Kantian one? (tekst z 20 maja 2013)

Niedawno odbyła się konferencja międzynarodowa z zakresu etyki. Program można zobaczyć tu:

http://ifsid.ug.edu.pl/konferencje/Is_There_Anything_Like_Moral_Character&Virtue/

Ponieważ niektórzy mogą być zainteresowani praktyczną częścią Kantowskiej filozofii, a nie planuje się (o ile wiem) publikacji referatów w postaci tzw. materiałów pokonferencyjnych, pozwolę sobie na wrzucenie treści mojego wystąpienia tutaj.
Mój (aktualny) pogląd metaetyczny można podsumować tak: Kant jako punkt wyjścia i poprzez ostrożne „rozmiękczanie” go dojście do jakiejś sensownej teorii. Masa roboty, a jaspadam tymczasem do tego, co lubię (w filozofii) najbardziej: ontologii ogólnej!

The ethics of I. Kant is often regarded as untenable. His contemporary rivals are utilitarianisms of several sorts along with virtue ethics, at least if they assume after Aristotle eudaimonia as a primary goal of our moral life. In this talk I would like to grasp the essence of Kantian ethical theory as presented in his Critique of practical reason (and, to the minor extent, The groundwork for the metaphysics of morals) and to show where Kant’s argumentation fails (indeed, it is a common platitude that it does fail, but very few know exactly where and why).
First, I assume that the moral law has a form of a proposition with the operator of obligation as its main one and that it has logical value. Kant believes that this proposition is a priori and that to show this we can employ the argument used in the first Critique for establishing the aprioricity of space and time: if sth is a posteriori, then it is not necessary (it is contingent, that is). The moral law is necessary. Therefore, it is a priori [1]. Now, if necessity is understood here as the ontological necessity, the natural objection is that the first premise is false (or – more weakly – not evident) [2]. If, instead, the deontic necessity is intended, then the argument takes the different form: if sth is a posteriori, then it is not obligatory. The moral law begins with ‘it is obligatory that’. Therefore, it is a priori.
But how to interpret the first premise? It seems that the only one sensible construal is: that S does p doesn’t entail that S should do p (the proposal according to which ‘if S does p then it is not the case that S should do p’ is obviously false). But the difficulty is that the aprioricity of the obligation doesn’t follow then.
Second, Kant says:

But that reason may give laws it is necessary that it should only need to presuppose itself, because rules are objectively and universally valid only when they hold without any contingent subjective conditions, which distinguish one rational being from another. (…) All practical principles which presuppose an object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will are empirical and can furnish no practical laws. By the matter of the faculty of desire I mean an object the realization of which is desired. Now, if the desire for this object precedes the practical rule and is the condition of our making it a principle, then I say (in the first place) this principle is in that case wholly empirical, for then what determines the choice is the idea of an object and that relation of this idea to the subject by which its faculty of desire is determined to its realization. Such a relation to the subject is called the pleasure in the realization of an object. This, then, must be presupposed as a condition of the possibility of determination of the will. But it is impossible to know a priori of any idea of an object whether it will be connected with pleasure or pain, or be indifferent (pp. 18f).

Kant means here the following things. Imperatives assuming any desire cannot oblige. If S wants p then the existence of p is a pleasure for S (but not necessarily vice versa). Now, one cannot know a priori of anything whether this thing is a pleasure for somebody. Then, one cannot know a priori of anything whether somebody wants this thing. Kant assumes here tacitly that the lack of aprioricity (hence, aposterioricity) excludes the necessity, the premise about which we’ve just said. On the other hand, Kant perfectly knows that “to be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being, and this, therefore, is inevitably a determining principle of its faculty of desire” (p. 23; we read the same in The groundwork…). By ‘happiness’ he understands “a rational being’s consciousness of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence” (p. 20) or – briefly – “satisfaction with our whole existence” (p. 23). So happiness is for Kant a psychological state referring to the individual whose state it is. But this stance is in conflict with expressions such as ‘you are my happiness’ (in Polish; the English counterpart will be ‘you are my life’), although Kantian (and, ultimately, the ancient Greek) notion of happiness is nowadays quite popular [3] . Not surprisingly, Kant stresses both ego- and hedocentric dimension of happiness (if the quality of the state is the only factor that counts, then it is irrelevant what caused the state – pp. 20f)[4] and its little interpersonal and temporal stability (p. 24) along with its conflict-generating nature (p. 27). Of course, empirical studies in happiness conceived of in this way can discover some regularities [5] , but Kant will be glad with strict laws only, since approximate norm will be not certain, and as such it cannot oblige, for him (see pp. 36f, 130). Once again we find the conviction that aposterioricity excludes necessity: Even if people were unanimous as to the notion of happiness and the means by which the happiness should be attained, this unanimity would be de facto, but not ex necessitate (p. 24). It must be stressed, however, that it doesn’t mean that no obligation to seek one’s own happiness is admissible according to Kant: but it is just the form of the categorical imperative that extends the matter of maxim of one’s own happiness to the happiness of others, since Kant thinks that the law obliging one to commit sth that everybody necessarily seeks would be just senseless (pp. 34f, 37) [6]. On the other hand, we should remember that Kant regards the notion of happiness as almost useless when used in practice, and the attempt to formulate the moral laws with the help of this notion as a worthless enterprise. That is why the following declaration can be confusing:

It may even in certain respects be a duty to provide for happiness; partly, because (including skill, wealth, riches) it contains means for the fulfillment of our duty; partly, because the absence of it (e.g., poverty) implies temptations to transgress our duty (p. 95; similar passage is in The groundwork…).

This inconsistency in Kant’s theory should be somehow repaired.
Another charge that can be leveled against Kant’s conception would be that one doesn’t know why “the moral law (…) does not require a justification” (pp. 48f)[7] . Kant holds that the moral law cannot be explained further for exactly the same reason for one cannot explain how free will is possible (pp. 47, 74): for Kant, one can demonstrate at best that it is possible, since it is just the necessary condition of the moral law, the latter being brute fact. Of course, the simplest naturalistic explanation of the moral law involves internalization of rules imposed on us by parents, teachers, society etc. Kant, however, is aware of this fact: he ascribes this account to M. de Montaigne and B. de Mandeville (p. 41). It is not hard to guess that Kant considers their views as implying that motivations determining the moral will are subjective, hence “evidently incapable of furnishing the universal principle of morality” (p. 41) [8].
Next, one can ask which bearer of the moral value is the primary one? Is the moral law sth that is the most valuable, whereas any value of the human being stems from obeying this law (and, what is more, only if the individual feels obliged to carry out her duty – that is, only if she acts selflessly)? Or is it rather every human being that has a moral value, the ones disobeying the moral law included – just because of their “extrasensuous destination”, using Kantian terms? Although Kant very often speaks as if he opts for the first disjunct, Critique of practical reason has two texts where Kant suggests the second one (pp. 89f, 135). In The groundwork… Kant openly says that the ground of the categorical imperative lies in the absolute value of every rational and free being, what in turn softens the objection of taking the moral law as a brute fact. It becomes apparent, by the way, that it is not the case that Kantian ethics is purely formal, that is contains only norms, obligations, duties etc, but no values (other than obeying the moral law with an appropriate intention)[9] .
The classic objection to Kantian ethics is that the categorical imperative is at most the necessary condition of the moral value of the maxim (or the act done according to this maxim), but not, as Kant would want it, the sufficient one (consider, for example, the maxim such as ‘snap your finger once a year’). But Kant would respond that this in not disastrous for the categorical imperative – things would be worse if the morally wrong maxim were invented as a counterexample, but so far no one has proposed any [10] .
Now for the last problem with Kant’s praktische Vernunft. We would render the essence of Kantian conception incomplete if we neglected the so-called dialectic of practical reason, this dialectic being such that three famous postulates are regarded by Kant as its immediate consequences. First, the moral obligation, whose existence is taken by Kant, as we saw, to be indubitable, implies freedom of the will (if I should do p, then I can do p, but I may also not do p: if I cannot not do p, the obligation would be, as it was said, senseless). Second, for Kant, we should seek to attain moral perfection, that is, both to obey the moral law and to do so with the right intention, that is, feeling obliged to carry out our duties. However, someone who always acts like this is the ideal only, and as such this very ideal cannot be exemplified in the phenomenal world. But if we are obliged to realize this ideal, then the phenomenal world cannot be the only one, and we must last longer than up to our bodily death – we, as moral, not only physical persons, that means that we must retain, for example, the memories of what has happened in this world [11] . Third conclusion is the most controversial: we should realize not only bonum supremum, or virtue (in the Kantian sense of the term), but summum bonum, or – in other words – virtue and happiness, the latter restricted by the individual’s degree of being virtuous, so to say. Alas, this is once again impossible if we consider this world as the only one. Interestingly, Kant could have drawn here the conclusion that we would be therefore able to have enough knowledge (insights in other consciences) and power (to make people happy – if they deserve it). Instead, he infers from this the existence of God, who is to play this role (during the last judgment). Moreover, God must have any attribute ascribed to Him in the rationalistic theistic metaphysics (p. 144). It seems that Kant exaggerates here, but this impression is softened by his frequent remarks that we have here only “the postulate”, “the reasonable hypothesis”, “the justified hope” or “the reasoned faith” [12].
The conclusion of my study in Kant’s second Critique could be succinctly formulated thus: praktische Vernunft is not (wholly) a Kantian one. The question of what it is like, then, must be answered in another talk.
Permit me to close my lecture with a remark concerning the main topic of our conference, since the question of grounds of Kant’s ethics is only loosely connected to it (that is why the Organizers placed me at the end :)). For Kant, like for almost all his predecessors and contemporaries as well, the dilemma ‘virtue or situation’ didn’t exist since at that time it was obvious that virtue existed – the difference is that Kant didn’t exclude the possibility that as an ideal only (it was particularly addressed in The groundwork…). I agree with H. Hasse [co-lecturer in the parallel section – TK] that virtuous people should avoid tempting situations; anyway, it has been appreciated at least since the middle ages (it was also appreciated by Kant), but it should be also remembered that in this context some skeptics would say that virtue is no more than the ability to avoid tempting situations Some would also add that the forming of a character is no more than situating, so to say, the young in such situations that she gains the right view on possible future situations she will find herself in (and will make right choices accordingly) – and that this is the argument for the situationist theory since we can describe the forming of a character in situationist terms, but not vice versa. For me, however, quite the contrary: gaining this view is the necessary (but not sufficient) factor of the character trait as traditionally described.

FOOTNOTES

[1] I. Kant, The critique of practical reason, translated by T. K. Abbott, 1788, pp. 12, 52 (I use the version accessible at http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/kant/critique-practical-reason.pdf. In case of The groundwork for the metaphysics of morals, I use A. Wood’s translation accessible at http://www.inp.uw.edu.pl/mdsie/Political_Thought/Kant – groundwork for the metaphysics of morals with essays.pdf

[2] See e.g. famous S. Kripke’s Naming and necessity (Blackwell 1980), where he gives the examples of the alleged necessary a posteriori propositions, such as ‘The Morning Star is The Evening Star’ or ‘This lectern is made of wood’.

[3] See, for example, W. Tatarkiewicz, O szczesciu (Of happiness, many editions), W. Janikowski, Naturalizm etyczny we wspolczesnej filozofii analitycznej (Ethical naturalism in contemporary analytical philosophy), Warszawa: Semper, pp. 239f.

[4] He rejected the qualitative difference between pleasures on account of the fact that there is the possibility of preference (pp. 20-22; M. Scheler, instead, claimed that the very possibility of preference is a reason for the qualitative-hierarchical difference between values).

[5] See Janikowski, pp. 242-244.

[6] Another argument is as follows: if a crime “is in itself punishable, that is, forfeits happiness (at least partially)” (p. 38), the guilt of the accused would rather consist in not carrying out her duty to make herself happy, as a result of which any punishment should be abolished (sic). The utilitarian would respond that after taking into account the happiness of others we will have non sequitur.

[7] Compare Janikowski, p. 58.

[8] A typical naturalists’ response will be obvious: Kant imagines somebody explaining her action by “I was just told to do so”, whereas naturalists don’t view imperatives as “a reflection of the extrasensuous world”, as Kant would put it, but as a kind of social construction or empirical generalization or even necessary a posteriori: observe that assuming ‘it is necessary that: if you want to be happy, then do not treat other people as means only’ and ‘it is necessary that everybody wants to be happy’, we get the a posteriori judgment ‘it is necessary that you shouldn’t treat other people as means only’. Speaking for myself, I would adopt the latter proposal provided that we could clarify the notion of happiness. [uwaga z 16.04.18: ostatnie zdanie dziś uważam za fałszywe]

[9] M. Scheler was especially sensitive to this “formal” aspect of Kantian theory.

[10] For example, R. Brandt in Ethical theory. The problems of normative and critical ethics put forward the two following alleged counterexamples: ‘whenever a college student borrows 9.81 $ from her neighbor, and this student has such-and-such age, height and so on, whereas her neighbor has such-and-such age, height and so on, then she may not pay it back’ (understood as this student’s maxim) and ‘let the owner of slaves treat them unfair’ (understood as this owner’s maxim). But both maxims can be easily rejected by the classic Kantian ‘what would you do if the roles were reversed’ test (this test is especially stressed in The groundwork…). In addition, the first one is an obvious ad hoc rule.

[11] The Szuttas helped me understand that this is a delicate point in Kantian dialectic: one should not take it as an excuse in case of immoral acting saying ‘do not worry, I have infinite time to become an ideal so let me commit some sins here in this world’ See also below, the third postulate.

[12] On the other hand, I think he chose God since enough knowledge and power does not follow, as it seems, enough goodness. Trusting people is more risky.

PS

Yesterday during discussion with my colleagues I discovered that Kant’s argumentation for free will suffers from vicious circle: namely, free will is entailed by the moral law, the moral law is founded on the absolute value of each human being, whereas the latter is grounded in the fact that she has reason and free will